diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 6bd97cd50d62..7e061ed449aa 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -422,6 +422,14 @@ The possible values in this file are:
   'RSB filling'   Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
   =============   ===========================================
 
+  - EIBRS Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer (PBRSB) protection status:
+
+  ===========================  =======================================================
+  'PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence'   CPU is affected and protection of RSB on VMEXIT enabled
+  'PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable'    CPU is vulnerable
+  'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected'  CPU is not affected by PBRSB
+  ===========================  =======================================================
+
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
 vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
 report vulnerability.
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 5f4dbcb43307..05027bd1d7d4 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 10
-SUBLEVEL = 135
-EXTRAVERSION =
+SUBLEVEL = 136
+EXTRAVERSION = -rc1
 NAME = Dare mighty things
 
 # *DOCUMENTATION*
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
index 01e22fe40823..9f4599014854 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static void neon_poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *src,
 {
 	if (unlikely(!dctx->sset)) {
 		if (!dctx->rset) {
-			poly1305_init_arch(dctx, src);
+			poly1305_init_arm64(&dctx->h, src);
 			src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
 			len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
 			dctx->rset = 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 16c045906b2a..159646da3c6b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2447,7 +2447,7 @@ config RETPOLINE
 config RETHUNK
 	bool "Enable return-thunks"
 	depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
-	default y
+	default y if X86_64
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard
 	  against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation.
@@ -2456,21 +2456,21 @@ config RETHUNK
 
 config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
 	default y
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
 
 config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
 	default y
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
 
 config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
 	default y
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 2a51ee2f5a0f..37ba0cdf99aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK		(11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
 #define X86_FEATURE_UNRET		(11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW		(11*32+16) /* "" Use IBPB during runtime firmware calls */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
@@ -429,5 +430,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
 #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 407de670cd60..144dc164b759 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -148,6 +148,10 @@
 						 * are restricted to targets in
 						 * kernel.
 						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO		BIT(24)	/*
+						 * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
+						 * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
+						 */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
 #define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index c3e8e50633ea..0acd99329923 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@
 774:						\
 	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp;	\
 	dec	reg;				\
-	jnz	771b;
+	jnz	771b;				\
+	/* barrier for jnz misprediction */	\
+	lfence;
 
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
@@ -118,13 +120,28 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
+.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
+	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
+	call .Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@
+	int3
+.Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@:
+	add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP
+	lfence
+.endm
+
  /*
   * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
   * monstrosity above, manually.
   */
-.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2
+.ifb \ftr2
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
+.else
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr, "jmp .Lunbalanced_\@", \ftr2
+.endif
 	__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
+.Lunbalanced_\@:
+	ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
 .endm
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 2e5762faf774..859a3f59526c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1291,6 +1291,53 @@ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
 	}
 }
 
+static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks
+	 * after VM exit:
+	 *
+	 * 1) RSB underflow
+	 *
+	 * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
+	 *
+	 * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing
+	 * the RSB.
+	 *
+	 * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch
+	 * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared
+	 * because of #2.  Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike
+	 * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.
+	 *
+	 * eIBRS should protect against RSB poisoning, but if the EIBRS_PBRSB
+	 * bug is present then a LITE version of RSB protection is required,
+	 * just a single call needs to retire before a RET is executed.
+	 */
+	switch (mode) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
+		return;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
+			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
+		}
+		return;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit");
+	dump_stack();
+}
+
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -1441,28 +1488,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
 	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
 
-	/*
-	 * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks
-	 * after vmexit:
-	 *
-	 * 1) RSB underflow
-	 *
-	 * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
-	 *
-	 * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing
-	 * the RSB.
-	 *
-	 * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch
-	 * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared
-	 * because of #2.  Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike
-	 * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.
-	 *
-	 * eIBRS, on the other hand, has RSB-poisoning protections, so it
-	 * doesn't need RSB clearing after vmexit.
-	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) ||
-	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS))
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+	spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode);
 
 	/*
 	 * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware.  IBRS
@@ -2215,6 +2241,19 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
 	return "";
 }
 
+static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) ||
+		    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT))
+			return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence";
+		else
+			return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable";
+	} else {
+		return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected";
+	}
+}
+
 static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
@@ -2227,12 +2266,13 @@ static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
 	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
 		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n");
 
-	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
 		       spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
 		       ibpb_state(),
 		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
 		       stibp_state(),
 		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
+		       pbrsb_eibrs_state(),
 		       spectre_v2_module_string());
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 901352bd3b42..9fc91482e85e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1024,6 +1024,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #define NO_SWAPGS		BIT(6)
 #define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT	BIT(7)
 #define NO_SPECTRE_V2		BIT(8)
+#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB		BIT(9)
 
 #define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist)	\
 	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist)
@@ -1064,7 +1065,7 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
 
 	/*
 	 * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
@@ -1074,7 +1075,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	 * good enough for our purposes.
 	 */
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D,		NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT,		NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L,		NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D,		NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
 
 	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
 	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
@@ -1252,6 +1255,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
+	    !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index 857fa0fc49fa..982138bebb70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -197,11 +197,13 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	 * entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow.
 	 *
 	 * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't
-	 * need the RSB filling sequence.  But it does need to be enabled
-	 * before the first unbalanced RET.
+	 * need the RSB filling sequence.  But it does need to be enabled, and a
+	 * single call to retire, before the first unbalanced RET.
          */
 
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
+			   X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
+
 
 	pop %_ASM_ARG2	/* @flags */
 	pop %_ASM_ARG1	/* @vmx */
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c
index 598fd19b65fa..45973aa6e06d 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c
@@ -29,16 +29,26 @@
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "BERT: " fmt
+
+#define ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_RECORDS 5
 #define ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN 1024
 
 static int bert_disable;
 
+/*
+ * Print "all" the error records in the BERT table, but avoid huge spam to
+ * the console if the BIOS included oversize records, or too many records.
+ * Skipping some records here does not lose anything because the full
+ * data is available to user tools in:
+ *	/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/BERT
+ */
 static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region,
 				  unsigned int region_len)
 {
 	struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus =
 		(struct acpi_hest_generic_status *)region;
 	int remain = region_len;
+	int printed = 0, skipped = 0;
 	u32 estatus_len;
 
 	while (remain >= sizeof(struct acpi_bert_region)) {
@@ -46,24 +56,26 @@ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region,
 		if (remain < estatus_len) {
 			pr_err(FW_BUG "Truncated status block (length: %u).\n",
 			       estatus_len);
-			return;
+			break;
 		}
 
 		/* No more error records. */
 		if (!estatus->block_status)
-			return;
+			break;
 
 		if (cper_estatus_check(estatus)) {
 			pr_err(FW_BUG "Invalid error record.\n");
-			return;
+			break;
 		}
 
-		pr_info_once("Error records from previous boot:\n");
-		if (region_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN)
+		if (estatus_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN &&
+		    printed < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_RECORDS) {
+			pr_info_once("Error records from previous boot:\n");
 			cper_estatus_print(KERN_INFO HW_ERR, estatus);
-		else
-			pr_info_once("Max print length exceeded, table data is available at:\n"
-				     "/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/BERT");
+			printed++;
+		} else {
+			skipped++;
+		}
 
 		/*
 		 * Because the boot error source is "one-time polled" type,
@@ -75,6 +87,9 @@ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region,
 		estatus = (void *)estatus + estatus_len;
 		remain -= estatus_len;
 	}
+
+	if (skipped)
+		pr_info(HW_ERR "Skipped %d error records\n", skipped);
 }
 
 static int __init setup_bert_disable(char *str)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
index 7b9793cb55c5..e39d59ad6496 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
@@ -424,7 +424,6 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = {
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
 	.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
 		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"),
 		},
 	},
@@ -432,59 +431,75 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = {
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
 	.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "AURA1501"),
 		},
 	},
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
 	.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "EDUBOOK1502"),
 		},
 	},
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
-	.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
+	.ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "AURA1501"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
 		},
 	},
+	/*
+	 * The TongFang PF5PU1G, PF4NU1F, PF5NU1G, and PF5LUXG/TUXEDO BA15 Gen10,
+	 * Pulse 14/15 Gen1, and Pulse 15 Gen2 have the same problem as the Clevo
+	 * NL5xRU and NL5xNU/TUXEDO Aura 15 Gen1 and Gen2. See the description
+	 * above.
+	 */
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
-	.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
+	.ident = "TongFang PF5PU1G",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "EDUBOOK1502"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5PU1G"),
 		},
 	},
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
-	.ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
+	.ident = "TongFang PF4NU1F",
+	.matches = {
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF4NU1F"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
+	.ident = "TongFang PF4NU1F",
 	.matches = {
 		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PULSE1401"),
 		},
 	},
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
-	.ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
+	.ident = "TongFang PF5NU1G",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5NU1G"),
 		},
 	},
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
-	.ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
+	.ident = "TongFang PF5NU1G",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PULSE1501"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
+	.ident = "TongFang PF5LUXG",
+	.matches = {
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5LUXG"),
 		},
 	},
-
 	/*
 	 * Desktops which falsely report a backlight and which our heuristics
 	 * for this do not catch.
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c
index 1b9743b7f2ef..d263eac784da 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c
@@ -401,6 +401,8 @@ static const struct bcm_subver_table bcm_uart_subver_table[] = {
 	{ 0x6606, "BCM4345C5"	},	/* 003.006.006 */
 	{ 0x230f, "BCM4356A2"	},	/* 001.003.015 */
 	{ 0x220e, "BCM20702A1"  },	/* 001.002.014 */
+	{ 0x420d, "BCM4349B1"	},	/* 002.002.013 */
+	{ 0x420e, "BCM4349B1"	},	/* 002.002.014 */
 	{ 0x4217, "BCM4329B1"   },	/* 002.002.023 */
 	{ 0x6106, "BCM4359C0"	},	/* 003.001.006 */
 	{ 0x4106, "BCM4335A0"	},	/* 002.001.006 */
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c
index 538232b4c42a..a699e6166aef 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c
@@ -399,6 +399,18 @@ static const struct usb_device_id blacklist_table[] = {
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0bda, 0xc822), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
 						     BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
 
+	/* Realtek 8852CE Bluetooth devices */
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x04ca, 0x4007), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
+						     BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x04c5, 0x1675), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
+						     BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cb8, 0xc558), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
+						     BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3587), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
+						     BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3586), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
+						     BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+
 	/* Realtek Bluetooth devices */
 	{ USB_VENDOR_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x0bda, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x01),
 	  .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK },
@@ -416,6 +428,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id blacklist_table[] = {
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0489, 0xe0d9), .driver_info = BTUSB_MEDIATEK |
 						     BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH |
 						     BTUSB_VALID_LE_STATES },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3568), .driver_info = BTUSB_MEDIATEK |
+						     BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH |
+						     BTUSB_VALID_LE_STATES },
 
 	/* Additional Realtek 8723AE Bluetooth devices */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0930, 0x021d), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK },
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c
index 259a643377c2..3f6e96a4e114 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c
@@ -1489,8 +1489,10 @@ static const struct of_device_id bcm_bluetooth_of_match[] = {
 	{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm4345c5" },
 	{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm4330-bt" },
 	{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm43438-bt", .data = &bcm43438_device_data },
+	{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm4349-bt", .data = &bcm43438_device_data },
 	{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm43540-bt", .data = &bcm4354_device_data },
 	{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm4335a0" },
+	{ .compatible = "infineon,cyw55572-bt" },
 	{ },
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, bcm_bluetooth_of_match);
diff --git a/drivers/macintosh/adb.c b/drivers/macintosh/adb.c
index 73b396189039..afb0942ccc29 100644
--- a/drivers/macintosh/adb.c
+++ b/drivers/macintosh/adb.c
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ do_adb_query(struct adb_request *req)
 
 	switch(req->data[1]) {
 	case ADB_QUERY_GETDEVINFO:
-		if (req->nbytes < 3)
+		if (req->nbytes < 3 || req->data[2] >= 16)
 			break;
 		mutex_lock(&adb_handler_mutex);
 		req->reply[0] = adb_handler[req->data[2]].original_address;
diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c
index be9ff6a74ecc..a643b2f2f4de 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -220,6 +220,9 @@ struct tun_struct {
 	struct tun_prog __rcu *steering_prog;
 	struct tun_prog __rcu *filter_prog;
 	struct ethtool_link_ksettings link_ksettings;
+	/* init args */
+	struct file *file;
+	struct ifreq *ifr;
 };
 
 struct veth {
@@ -227,6 +230,9 @@ struct veth {
 	__be16 h_vlan_TCI;
 };
 
+static void tun_flow_init(struct tun_struct *tun);
+static void tun_flow_uninit(struct tun_struct *tun);
+
 static int tun_napi_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 {
 	struct tun_file *tfile = container_of(napi, struct tun_file, napi);
@@ -975,6 +981,49 @@ static int check_filter(struct tap_filter *filter, const struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static const struct ethtool_ops tun_ethtool_ops;
 
+static int tun_net_init(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
+	struct ifreq *ifr = tun->ifr;
+	int err;
+
+	tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats);
+	if (!tun->pcpu_stats)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	spin_lock_init(&tun->lock);
+
+	err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tun_flow_init(tun);
+
+	dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
+			   TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
+			   NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
+	dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX;
+	dev->vlan_features = dev->features &
+			     ~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
+			       NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);
+
+	tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) |
+		      (ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES);
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
+	err = tun_attach(tun, tun->file, false, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI,
+			 ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS, false);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		tun_flow_uninit(tun);
+		security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
+		free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
+		return err;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Net device detach from fd. */
 static void tun_net_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
 {
@@ -1216,6 +1265,7 @@ static int tun_net_change_carrier(struct net_device *dev, bool new_carrier)
 }
 
 static const struct net_device_ops tun_netdev_ops = {
+	.ndo_init		= tun_net_init,
 	.ndo_uninit		= tun_net_uninit,
 	.ndo_open		= tun_net_open,
 	.ndo_stop		= tun_net_close,
@@ -1296,6 +1346,7 @@ static int tun_xdp_tx(struct net_device *dev, struct xdp_buff *xdp)
 }
 
 static const struct net_device_ops tap_netdev_ops = {
+	.ndo_init		= tun_net_init,
 	.ndo_uninit		= tun_net_uninit,
 	.ndo_open		= tun_net_open,
 	.ndo_stop		= tun_net_close,
@@ -1336,7 +1387,7 @@ static void tun_flow_uninit(struct tun_struct *tun)
 #define MAX_MTU 65535
 
 /* Initialize net device. */
-static void tun_net_init(struct net_device *dev)
+static void tun_net_initialize(struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
 
@@ -2268,10 +2319,6 @@ static void tun_free_netdev(struct net_device *dev)
 	BUG_ON(!(list_empty(&tun->disabled)));
 
 	free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
-	/* We clear pcpu_stats so that tun_set_iff() can tell if
-	 * tun_free_netdev() has been called from register_netdevice().
-	 */
-	tun->pcpu_stats = NULL;
 
 	tun_flow_uninit(tun);
 	security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
@@ -2784,41 +2831,16 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
 		tun->rx_batched = 0;
 		RCU_INIT_POINTER(tun->steering_prog, NULL);
 
-		tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats);
-		if (!tun->pcpu_stats) {
-			err = -ENOMEM;
-			goto err_free_dev;
-		}
+		tun->ifr = ifr;
+		tun->file = file;
 
-		spin_lock_init(&tun->lock);
-
-		err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security);
-		if (err < 0)
-			goto err_free_stat;
-
-		tun_net_init(dev);
-		tun_flow_init(tun);
-
-		dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
-				   TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
-				   NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
-		dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX;
-		dev->vlan_features = dev->features &
-				     ~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
-				       NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);
-
-		tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) |
-			      (ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES);
-
-		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
-		err = tun_attach(tun, file, false, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI,
-				 ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS, false);
-		if (err < 0)
-			goto err_free_flow;
+		tun_net_initialize(dev);
 
 		err = register_netdevice(tun->dev);
-		if (err < 0)
-			goto err_detach;
+		if (err < 0) {
+			free_netdev(dev);
+			return err;
+		}
 		/* free_netdev() won't check refcnt, to aovid race
 		 * with dev_put() we need publish tun after registration.
 		 */
@@ -2835,24 +2857,6 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
 
 	strcpy(ifr->ifr_name, tun->dev->name);
 	return 0;
-
-err_detach:
-	tun_detach_all(dev);
-	/* We are here because register_netdevice() has failed.
-	 * If register_netdevice() already called tun_free_netdev()
-	 * while dealing with the error, tun->pcpu_stats has been cleared.
-	 */
-	if (!tun->pcpu_stats)
-		goto err_free_dev;
-
-err_free_flow:
-	tun_flow_uninit(tun);
-	security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
-err_free_stat:
-	free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
-err_free_dev:
-	free_netdev(dev);
-	return err;
 }
 
 static void tun_get_iff(struct tun_struct *tun, struct ifreq *ifr)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h
index 0a1634238e67..6b45e63fae4b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ struct ath9k_htc_rxbuf {
 struct ath9k_htc_rx {
 	struct list_head rxbuf;
 	spinlock_t rxbuflock;
+	bool initialized;
 };
 
 #define ATH9K_HTC_TX_CLEANUP_INTERVAL 50 /* ms */
@@ -305,6 +306,7 @@ struct ath9k_htc_tx {
 	DECLARE_BITMAP(tx_slot, MAX_TX_BUF_NUM);
 	struct timer_list cleanup_timer;
 	spinlock_t tx_lock;
+	bool initialized;
 };
 
 struct ath9k_htc_tx_ctl {
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c
index 30ddf333e04d..43a743ec9d9e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c
@@ -808,6 +808,11 @@ int ath9k_tx_init(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv)
 	skb_queue_head_init(&priv->tx.data_vi_queue);
 	skb_queue_head_init(&priv->tx.data_vo_queue);
 	skb_queue_head_init(&priv->tx.tx_failed);
+
+	/* Allow ath9k_wmi_event_tasklet(WMI_TXSTATUS_EVENTID) to operate. */
+	smp_wmb();
+	priv->tx.initialized = true;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1133,6 +1138,10 @@ void ath9k_htc_rxep(void *drv_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct ath9k_htc_rxbuf *rxbuf = NULL, *tmp_buf = NULL;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	/* Check if ath9k_rx_init() completed. */
+	if (!data_race(priv->rx.initialized))
+		goto err;
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->rx.rxbuflock, flags);
 	list_for_each_entry(tmp_buf, &priv->rx.rxbuf, list) {
 		if (!tmp_buf->in_process) {
@@ -1188,6 +1197,10 @@ int ath9k_rx_init(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv)
 		list_add_tail(&rxbuf->list, &priv->rx.rxbuf);
 	}
 
+	/* Allow ath9k_htc_rxep() to operate. */
+	smp_wmb();
+	priv->rx.initialized = true;
+
 	return 0;
 
 err:
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c
index fe29ad4b9023..f315c54bd3ac 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c
@@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ void ath9k_wmi_event_tasklet(struct tasklet_struct *t)
 					     &wmi->drv_priv->fatal_work);
 			break;
 		case WMI_TXSTATUS_EVENTID:
+			/* Check if ath9k_tx_init() completed. */
+			if (!data_race(priv->tx.initialized))
+				break;
+
 			spin_lock_bh(&priv->tx.tx_lock);
 			if (priv->tx.flags & ATH9K_HTC_OP_TX_DRAIN) {
 				spin_unlock_bh(&priv->tx.tx_lock);
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 54ba20492ad1..ec53f52a06a5 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	(11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK		(11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
 #define X86_FEATURE_UNRET		(11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 407de670cd60..144dc164b759 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -148,6 +148,10 @@
 						 * are restricted to targets in
 						 * kernel.
 						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO		BIT(24)	/*
+						 * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
+						 * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
+						 */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
 #define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index b9ee2ded381a..7943e748916d 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -4180,7 +4180,8 @@ struct bpf_sock {
 	__u32 src_ip4;
 	__u32 src_ip6[4];
 	__u32 src_port;		/* host byte order */
-	__u32 dst_port;		/* network byte order */
+	__be16 dst_port;	/* network byte order */
+	__u16 :16;		/* zero padding */
 	__u32 dst_ip4;
 	__u32 dst_ip6[4];
 	__u32 state;
diff --git a/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat b/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat
index b0bf56c5f120..a1efcfbd8b9e 100755
--- a/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat
+++ b/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat
@@ -1646,7 +1646,8 @@ Press any other key to refresh statistics immediately.
                          .format(values))
             if len(pids) > 1:
                 sys.exit('Error: Multiple processes found (pids: {}). Use "-p"'
-                         ' to specify the desired pid'.format(" ".join(pids)))
+                         ' to specify the desired pid'
+                         .format(" ".join(map(str, pids))))
             namespace.pid = pids[0]
 
     argparser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=description_text,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c
index af87118e748e..e8b5bf707cd4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 /* Copyright (c) 2019 Facebook */
 
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <sched.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
 enum bpf_linum_array_idx {
 	EGRESS_LINUM_IDX,
 	INGRESS_LINUM_IDX,
+	READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX,
 	__NR_BPF_LINUM_ARRAY_IDX,
 };
 
@@ -43,8 +46,16 @@ static __u64 child_cg_id;
 static int linum_map_fd;
 static __u32 duration;
 
-static __u32 egress_linum_idx = EGRESS_LINUM_IDX;
-static __u32 ingress_linum_idx = INGRESS_LINUM_IDX;
+static bool create_netns(void)
+{
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(unshare(CLONE_NEWNET), "create netns"))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(system("ip link set dev lo up"), "bring up lo"))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
 
 static void print_sk(const struct bpf_sock *sk, const char *prefix)
 {
@@ -92,19 +103,24 @@ static void check_result(void)
 {
 	struct bpf_tcp_sock srv_tp, cli_tp, listen_tp;
 	struct bpf_sock srv_sk, cli_sk, listen_sk;
-	__u32 ingress_linum, egress_linum;
+	__u32 idx, ingress_linum, egress_linum, linum;
 	int err;
 
-	err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &egress_linum_idx,
-				  &egress_linum);
+	idx = EGRESS_LINUM_IDX;
+	err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &idx, &egress_linum);
 	CHECK(err == -1, "bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd)",
 	      "err:%d errno:%d\n", err, errno);
 
-	err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &ingress_linum_idx,
-				  &ingress_linum);
+	idx = INGRESS_LINUM_IDX;
+	err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &idx, &ingress_linum);
 	CHECK(err == -1, "bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd)",
 	      "err:%d errno:%d\n", err, errno);
 
+	idx = READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX;
+	err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &idx, &linum);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, READ_SK_DST_PORT_IDX)");
+	ASSERT_EQ(linum, 0, "failure in read_sk_dst_port on line");
+
 	memcpy(&srv_sk, &skel->bss->srv_sk, sizeof(srv_sk));
 	memcpy(&srv_tp, &skel->bss->srv_tp, sizeof(srv_tp));
 	memcpy(&cli_sk, &skel->bss->cli_sk, sizeof(cli_sk));
@@ -263,7 +279,7 @@ static void test(void)
 	char buf[DATA_LEN];
 
 	/* Prepare listen_fd */
-	listen_fd = start_server(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, "::1", 0, 0);
+	listen_fd = start_server(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, "::1", 0xcafe, 0);
 	/* start_server() has logged the error details */
 	if (CHECK_FAIL(listen_fd == -1))
 		goto done;
@@ -331,8 +347,12 @@ static void test(void)
 
 void test_sock_fields(void)
 {
-	struct bpf_link *egress_link = NULL, *ingress_link = NULL;
 	int parent_cg_fd = -1, child_cg_fd = -1;
+	struct bpf_link *link;
+
+	/* Use a dedicated netns to have a fixed listen port */
+	if (!create_netns())
+		return;
 
 	/* Create a cgroup, get fd, and join it */
 	parent_cg_fd = test__join_cgroup(PARENT_CGROUP);
@@ -353,17 +373,20 @@ void test_sock_fields(void)
 	if (CHECK(!skel, "test_sock_fields__open_and_load", "failed\n"))
 		goto done;
 
-	egress_link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.egress_read_sock_fields,
-						 child_cg_fd);
-	if (CHECK(IS_ERR(egress_link), "attach_cgroup(egress)", "err:%ld\n",
-		  PTR_ERR(egress_link)))
+	link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.egress_read_sock_fields, child_cg_fd);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "attach_cgroup(egress_read_sock_fields)"))
+		goto done;
+	skel->links.egress_read_sock_fields = link;
+
+	link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.ingress_read_sock_fields, child_cg_fd);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "attach_cgroup(ingress_read_sock_fields)"))
 		goto done;
+	skel->links.ingress_read_sock_fields = link;
 
-	ingress_link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.ingress_read_sock_fields,
-						  child_cg_fd);
-	if (CHECK(IS_ERR(ingress_link), "attach_cgroup(ingress)", "err:%ld\n",
-		  PTR_ERR(ingress_link)))
+	link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.read_sk_dst_port, child_cg_fd);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "attach_cgroup(read_sk_dst_port"))
 		goto done;
+	skel->links.read_sk_dst_port = link;
 
 	linum_map_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.linum_map);
 	sk_pkt_out_cnt_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.sk_pkt_out_cnt);
@@ -372,8 +395,7 @@ void test_sock_fields(void)
 	test();
 
 done:
-	bpf_link__destroy(egress_link);
-	bpf_link__destroy(ingress_link);
+	test_sock_fields__detach(skel);
 	test_sock_fields__destroy(skel);
 	if (child_cg_fd != -1)
 		close(child_cg_fd);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c
index 7967348b11af..43b31aa1fcf7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 enum bpf_linum_array_idx {
 	EGRESS_LINUM_IDX,
 	INGRESS_LINUM_IDX,
+	READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX,
 	__NR_BPF_LINUM_ARRAY_IDX,
 };
 
@@ -250,4 +251,48 @@ int ingress_read_sock_fields(struct __sk_buff *skb)
 	return CG_OK;
 }
 
+static __noinline bool sk_dst_port__load_word(struct bpf_sock *sk)
+{
+	__u32 *word = (__u32 *)&sk->dst_port;
+	return word[0] == bpf_htonl(0xcafe0000);
+}
+
+static __noinline bool sk_dst_port__load_half(struct bpf_sock *sk)
+{
+	__u16 *half = (__u16 *)&sk->dst_port;
+	return half[0] == bpf_htons(0xcafe);
+}
+
+static __noinline bool sk_dst_port__load_byte(struct bpf_sock *sk)
+{
+	__u8 *byte = (__u8 *)&sk->dst_port;
+	return byte[0] == 0xca && byte[1] == 0xfe;
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup_skb/egress")
+int read_sk_dst_port(struct __sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	__u32 linum, linum_idx;
+	struct bpf_sock *sk;
+
+	linum_idx = READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX;
+
+	sk = skb->sk;
+	if (!sk)
+		RET_LOG();
+
+	/* Ignore everything but the SYN from the client socket */
+	if (sk->state != BPF_TCP_SYN_SENT)
+		return CG_OK;
+
+	if (!sk_dst_port__load_word(sk))
+		RET_LOG();
+	if (!sk_dst_port__load_half(sk))
+		RET_LOG();
+	if (!sk_dst_port__load_byte(sk))
+		RET_LOG();
+
+	return CG_OK;
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
index ce13ece08d51..8c224eac93df 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
@@ -121,7 +121,25 @@
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
-	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [narrow load]",
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [word load] (backward compatibility)",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+	.result = ACCEPT,
+},
+{
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [half load]",
 	.insns = {
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
@@ -139,7 +157,64 @@
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
-	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [load 2nd byte]",
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [half load] (invalid)",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr = "invalid sock access",
+},
+{
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [byte load]",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 1),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+	.result = ACCEPT,
+},
+{
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [byte load] (invalid)",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr = "invalid sock access",
+},
+{
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): past sk->dst_port [half load] (invalid)",
 	.insns = {
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
@@ -149,7 +224,7 @@
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
 	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
-	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 1),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetofend(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)),
 	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c
index 2f37b90ee1a9..f600311fdc6a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c
@@ -73,20 +73,19 @@ void ucall_uninit(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 
 void ucall(uint64_t cmd, int nargs, ...)
 {
-	struct ucall uc = {
-		.cmd = cmd,
-	};
+	struct ucall uc = {};
 	va_list va;
 	int i;
 
+	WRITE_ONCE(uc.cmd, cmd);
 	nargs = nargs <= UCALL_MAX_ARGS ? nargs : UCALL_MAX_ARGS;
 
 	va_start(va, nargs);
 	for (i = 0; i < nargs; ++i)
-		uc.args[i] = va_arg(va, uint64_t);
+		WRITE_ONCE(uc.args[i], va_arg(va, uint64_t));
 	va_end(va);
 
-	*ucall_exit_mmio_addr = (vm_vaddr_t)&uc;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*ucall_exit_mmio_addr, (vm_vaddr_t)&uc);
 }
 
 uint64_t get_ucall(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id, struct ucall *uc)
